The process of innovation is driven by two main factors: new inventions and institutions supporting the transformation of inventions into marketable innovations. This paper proposes a new institution, called a semipublic contest, that has been neglected by the economic literature but exists frequently in practice. I show how semi-public contests can mitigate a dilemma that arises at a very early stage of innovative activity and specify the general requirements for situations in which a semi-public contest can increase welfare. This paper's results suggest that governments promote knowledge about the semi-public contest mechanism but refrain from direct public funding of contests.
Introduction
To foster innovation two main ingredients are necessary: new inventions and institutions supporting the transformation of inventions into marketable innovations (Scotchmer, 2004) . This paper proposes a new institution that has been neglected by the economic literature but exists frequently in practice. It shows how this institution, called a semi-public contest, can mitigate a dilemma that arises at a very early stage of innovative activity.
I analyze a situation where entrepreneurs, who can be interpreted as inventors endowed with project ideas of uncertain value, have to be matched with investors, each of whom owns financial resources and has the relevant expertise to innovate but lacks ideas. Matching is modeled as an auction, where entrepreneurs sell their projects to investors, who bid for them. If matching is not preceded by screening of the project quality, all investors will have the same expectation and, thus, compete away any profit to be made in bidding. Moreover, if investors have to bear a market entry cost before bidding, the zero profit from the auction may be insufficient to attract market entry. Conversely, if an investor screens an entrepreneur's project and gains inside information on the project value, the entrepreneur may expect that the investor will use his superior information when bidding and will extract some profit from the entrepreneur. This is related to a hold-up problem. Moreover, as entrepreneurs bear a cost for developing projects, the expected profit reduction can deter the development of innovations and, thus, reduce welfare. In this paper I model a mechanism (or institution) that exists in practice and can mitigate this dilemma.
According to this mechanism, an investor outsources screening to a jury of experts that produces a ranking of projects voluntarily entered by entrepreneurs.
Participation is costly for both sides. The values of the winning projects are publicized by the jury, which creates symmetric information amongst investors on the winners' project values. Thus, winners expect high bids for their projects and they earn a reputation, whose value grows in the level of competitiveness of the contest. The project values of contest losers, however, remain exclusive inside information of the contest sponsor.
Why would an investor sponsor a contest that exhibits a positive externality, as the sponsor pays all screening costs but competing investors also learn the values of winners' projects? The answer is that the sponsor benefits from exclusive inside information on contest losers, allowing better informed bids on their projects. By publicizing the identity of winners he reduces his payoff compared to exclusive private screening. But he creates an incentive for entrepreneurs to participate in the contest because they strive for the reputation and high payoff in case of winning. Thus, the sponsor is better off in equilibrium. His main trade-off arises when he determines the number of winning slots in his contest. If he increases this number, his contest becomes more attractive for entrepreneurs, which is especially important if other contests are set up by competing investors. If he reduces the number of winning slots, ceteris paribus his contest produces more losers and, thus, increases the number of projects the sponsor has inside information about.
Although the institution is new to the economic literature, semi-public contests are frequent phenomena in practice. For instance, a relatively new form of startup financing has appeared since the 1980s. Venture capital firms and business angels have joined with universities to attract ideas for new businesses through business plan competitions. In a business plan competition, entrepreneurs prepare and submit a complete business plan, including the description of their product or process idea, the target market, the management team, strategy, marketing, financial planning, etc. 1 Business plans are screened by a jury of experts, often encompassing venture capitalists, consultants, lawyers, public accountants, and business professors. The most promising business ideas are declared winners and, hence, earn a high reputation and exposure to investors, some of whom (from diverse industries) sponsor the contest. Section 4 of this paper outlines the key features of the "Moot Corp Competition", the world's first business plan competition for MBA students, and shows how they are reflected by the model's assumptions and findings. 2 I show that, if investors face competition and if the expected value of the reputation created by publicizing the winners is sufficiently high compared to the screening cost of investors and entrepreneurs, both sides are motivated to participate in a semi-public contest. In deciding this, an entrepreneur trades off the expected benefit of winning the contest against the cost he incurs during the screening and the expected loss in bidding in case of losing the contest.
contest. Sponsoring is exclusive because the sponsor prefers not to share the inside information on losers' types, despite the potential to share screening costs with other investors. The market for semi-public contests has characteristics of a natural monopoly. I specify the conditions under which a monopolistic contest exists in equilibrium. Moreover, depending on parameter realizations, it is possible that several contests are organized simultaneously and compete for entrepreneurs' participation. I show, however, that in equilibrium every entrepreneur will not participate in more than one contest.
Summarizing, semi-public contests can mitigate, yet not eliminate, a holdup problem faced by entrepreneurs as, ex post, contest winners do not suffer from hold up but losers do. Non-exclusive private screening, where investors share inside information on a certain project value, is unprofitable for investors and, hence, does not exist in equilibrium. I show that a semi-public contest can serve as a welfare enhancing "compromise" between investors and entrepreneurs saving each side a positive expected payoff from matching.
As these contests only exist if they are efficient when compared to no screening and private screening, this model does not suggest that government authorities intervene directly. However, there is an indirect role for public policy. First, as semi-public contests depend on active competition among investors, it is crucial that competition policy authorities safeguard competitive markets. Second, as the semi-public contest mechanism has been used selectively in practice but could potentially be used in many more fields, spreading information on how it works could make "investors" in some markets, who are feeling now that they only have the choice between private screening and no screening, consider using the semi-public contest mechanism to match with "entrepreneurs".
I endogenize the investors' choice of mechanism and the entrepreneurs' product development and contest participation decisions in a four-stage multiprincipal multi-agent game with incomplete information. First, entrepreneurs decide whether to develop their ideas into projects and investors decide whether to enter the market, or not. Second, investors choose sequentially among private screening, no screening, and a semi-public contest. In a contest, they also choose the number (not the identity) of winners. Third, each entrepreneur simultaneously chooses whether to participate in screening, if offered, and in which contest to participate, if more than one is offered. Contest winners' project values are publicized but the sponsor of a contest exclusively learns losers' values. Finally, every investor places a bid for every project in a first-price sealed bid auction.
The final stage draws on the seminal article by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Mil-grom, and Weber (1983) (henceforth: EMW) , who analyze a first-price sealed bid auction in a common-value setting when one bidder has more information on the item auctioned and the other bidders have symmetrically less information.
The key insight from EMW used in this model is that it pays for an investor to know more about the value of a project than competing investors.
The paper most related to this one is Rajan (1992) , which also draws on EMW to study entrepreneur financing. Rajan models the trade-off faced by an entrepreneur to choose between different forms of credit financing. He argues that the apparently efficient form, borrowing from an informed (insider) bank, comes at a cost: banks have bargaining power over the entrepreneurial firm's profits. This notion is related to the hold-up problem I identified above.
Rajan's focus and model, however, are different. In his model there is only one entrepreneur, not many; market entry of entrepreneurs and investors is not endogenous; and the entrepreneur may exert effort that affects the distribution of project returns. Felli and Roberts (2002) also endogenize entrepreneurs' efforts. In their matching model, many sellers of a good meet many buyers. In various specifications of the game, either sellers or buyers or both groups can invest specifically in their qualities, which influences their respective values when being matched.
Subsequently, buyers may simultaneously and independently submit bids to the sellers. In contrast both to Rajan (1992) and to Felli and Roberts (2002) , in my model the value of an entrepreneur's project is exogenously given, yet unknown to all players, and the complementarity of inputs from every entrepreneur and every investor is perfect. In turn, my model adds a new mechanism to the literature that can mitigate a dilemma at the very beginning of the process of innovation, where ideas may be developed endogenously up to a stage where entrepreneurs can discuss them with investors.
This focus on the early idea development stage is shared with Biais and Perotti (2008) , who treat the problem of stealing innovative ideas. They start from the notion that ideas may have several dimensions that can be discussed by an entrepreneur with different experts and propose a mechanism that allows the entrepreneur to avoid idea stealing.
Related to stage 3 of my paper, Azmat and Möller (2009) endogenize contestants' participation decisions if multiple contests compete for participants.
They also endogenize the contestants' effort decisions and the contest organizers' prize structures. I abstract from both issues in this paper. This is also why this paper has only weak links to the literature on contests and tournaments. 3
Instead, I endogenize participation of both market sides in the entire game, the screening technology of investors, and their bidding behavior.
My paper is also related to the literature on research contests. 4 In a research contest, suppliers of an innovation bid for a procurement contract that is offered by a monopsonistic buyer. In a semi-public contest, in contrast, first the suppliers (entrepreneurs) endogenously develop innovations. Next they have to be incentivized to participate in screening such that their project values are revealed-despite knowing that the inside buyer will exploit them later when bidding against less informed outside buyers. A semi-public contest can alleviate this problem because it serves as a buyer's commitment device to only exploit losers, not winners.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes the conditions that make existence of a semi-public contest part of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; this section also shows the main results.
Section 4 describes two applications of the model, business plan competitions and TV casting shows, in more detail. Section 5 concludes and specifies the general requirements for economic situations in which the use of semi-public contests may increase welfare. Appendix A presents several extensions and robustness checks. All proofs are in Appendix B.
The Model Entrepreneurs
On the seller side of a market there are N entrepreneurs, each of whom is endowed with one project idea and acting as inventor. N is common knowledge but, because the N entrepreneurs are drawn from a large population, their identities are unknown. The cost of development for entrepreneur i is D i , which is a realization of the random variableD i with support (0, ∞). All draws are i.i.d., hence,D i ≡D.D is common knowledge but i learns his realization D i privately before he decides whether to develop his project, or not. If i decides to spend D i , he obtains a project with the potential value Z i , which also represents i's talent and is a realization of the random variableZ i that has support [0,Z] , no atoms, and expectation E(Z). All draws are i.i.d., hence, Z i ≡Z. I will omit the subscript i whenever there is no danger of confusion.Z is statistically independent ofD and is common knowledge but nobody, including entrepreneur i, knows the realization Z i . Consequently, every entrepreneur has the same expectation about his own Z i . Every entrepreneur needs an investor to produce the value Z i .
The independence ofZ andD captures that the development cost of an idea depends on several exogenous factors, such as the industry or the potential production technology of the project. In contrast, the market value of an idea depends on other factors, such as the degree of competitiveness and consumer demand. Similarly, the assumption that i knows D i but not Z i reflects that the development cost is determined on the supply side, which entrepreneurs are assumed to know better than the market value, which is determined on the demand side. 5 Moreover, i does not know his potential competitors. Thus, even if he gets feedback from his friends or colleagues that his idea is "good" or "valuable", he does not know how valuable it is compared to other ideas.
Investors
On the buyer side of the market there are m + 1 identical investors, who may buy entrepreneurs' projects. They can be considered project developers who have both the necessary financial means and the knowledge to compare project values and to transform a project into a marketable product. However, they lack innovative ideas and, thus, need an entrepreneur's project to realize its value Z. To obtain an overview of the market and to learn which projects are developed by entrepreneurs, every investor j has to spend an entry cost F ≥ 0 for market research. Without further investigation each investor just can guess the true value of a randomly chosen project and, thus, expects E(Z).
Summarizing, at the beginning of the game an entrepreneur is endowed with an idea that just has a potential value. Only if he spends the development cost, he transforms his idea into a project that can be presented and sold to an investor. The investor, after buying a project, has to develop it further into a marketable product. This paper only offers a reduced form model of the product development process (by normalizing the net present value for the investor to Z i ). Instead its focus is on the process until an investor buys a project from an 5 For instance, in life sciences Di can be very high but the value Zi of the project might be low because close substitutes exist and Bertrand competition among them is likely. Conversely, the development cost of a new business method on the internet might be low but its value might be high if a first mover advantage can be exploited.
entrepreneur.

Screening
Each investor can hire an independent jury (see details below), which can screen an entrepreneur's project for a unit cost k. When offered a screening, entrepreneur i can choose to collaborate, which costs him c. Both k and c are specific to one screening instance. They reflect the time and the effort spent to interact with each other and to produce documents, etc. that are targeted to one specific screening. If a screening takes place, the jury learns the value of the entrepreneur's project, Z i , 6 and informs the investor financing the screening, but nobody else, about it. An investor with such superior information is an insider. The remaining m investors are outsiders with respect to entrepreneur i. The entrepreneur, however, cannot compare his project to others' and, thus, does not learn anything by getting screened.
Forms of Screening
Screening can take either of two forms: exclusive private screening or semipublic contest. After a private screening the jury reports the value Z i of every project screened only to the investor who pays its screening cost. 7 Alternatively, if an investor j organizes a semi-public contest, he picks a number n j ≤ N of winning slots. Then, the independent jury publicly declares the n j entrepreneurs with the highest project values "winners" of the contest and publicizes their project values. 8
Outsourcing the picking of winners to a jury serves as a commitment device of the contest sponsor that indeed the best entrepreneurs are declared winners.
If the sponsor picked or published the contest winners himself, similar to private screening, he would have an incentive to misreport and to keep information on the best entrepreneurs private. This incentive would be foreseen by the outsiders and, hence, no reputation would be produced for the contest winners.
One interpretation of the completely truthful jury is that the jurors have a 6 The assumption of perfect value revelation is a shortcut. See Appendix A for a discussion of noisy screening by the jury. I could also assume that each entrepreneur must choose an effort level if he gets screened and assume that the cost of effort decreases in the Zi of an entrepreneur. This could produce a sorting effort equilibrium and enable the jury to observe Zi indirectly. Instead, as a short cut I assume that c is fixed and the jury observes Zi directly.
7 See Appendix A for a discussion of private screening by more than one investor. 8 See Appendix A for a discussion of the assumption that winners' precise values are publicized.
high reputation themselves, which translates into high expected future payoffs.
If they falsely declare winners, there is a probability of being detected and losing this reputation. 9
Publishing the identity of winners of a contest by the jury has two effects.
First, all outside investors can update their beliefs about the value of winners' and losers' projects. Second, each winner gains a reputation for being smart or talented, which is worth R(α j ) to him, where
is the probability of winning the contest sponsored by investor j, n j is the number of winning slots, and N j is the total number of participants in contest j. I make the following key assumption.
reputation production function of a semi-public contest, where:
Assumption 1 implies that winning a contest is only valuable if not every participant "wins" and that the value of winning a contest increases in a convex way the less likely it is to win. R can be interpreted as the net present value of future earnings attributable to winning the contest, apart from getting higher bids when selling a project. 10 Alternatively, R can be interpreted as the non-pecuniary utility from the esteem attached to winning a contest, which is enjoyed in other social situations. In both interpretations, the more exclusive it is to be a winner of a competitive contest the higher winning is valued. Note that private screening does not create a reputation because its results are not publicized and matching of an entrepreneur and a private screener cannot be taken as a positive signal from an outsider's perspective because all project values are nonnegative.
The publication of winners' identities creates a public signal on their values.
Analogous to private screening, I assume the jury informs the contest sponsor 9 It is straightforward to model such a subgame as a repeated game and to show that jurors who value future payoffs sufficiently highly will not declare winners falsely in equilibrium. To simplify the analysis I just assume truthful reporting. 10 This interpretation is intuitive if we assume that, in a repeated game context, it is prohibitively costly for an investor to check the history of past contest participation of each entrepreneur. In contrast, winners can prove that they have actually won a contest by producing appropriate documents, etc. Hence, contest losers and new entrepreneurs will be pooled in the future. Then we can normalize the reputation of each member of this pool to be zero.
As project values depend on entrepreneurs' talents, investors will believe that the probability that a former winner has a high project value is larger than the probability that another entrepreneur has a high value. This belief creates R ≥ 0.
about the precise realization Z i of every entrepreneur participating in the contest in private. Hence, the insider has an information advantage over outsiders with respect to the losers of the contest.
Besides private screening and semi-public contest, the third option of an investor is no screening. After screening or not screening, the project of one entrepreneur at a time is auctioned among all investors in a first-price, sealedbid auction.
Investors and entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral. Investors face no budget constraints and have infinite demand for investment projects with nonnegative expected payoff net of cost. I assume that, before placing their auction bids, all investors learn whether an entrepreneur was screened, or not. The solution concept used is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. As usual in such games, there are multiple equilibria, each sustained by its own beliefs.
Timing of the Game
Due to the ex ante symmetry of entrepreneurs, on the one side, and investors, on the other, I focus on symmetric equilibria. I proceed by first analyzing the benchmark case of no screening. Then, I introduce the option of exclusive private screening. Finally, I allow every investor to set up a semi-public contest and show the conditions under which the existence of a contest and active participation of entrepreneurs therein characterize an equilibrium.
11 The assumption of a complete sale of the project is made for simplicity. As long as Zi is the net present value of the share sold by the entrepreneur to the investor, the results of the analysis below hold. If in a common-value auction with symmetric bidders one bidder bids more than the others, he will bid more than the average value of projects auctioned and thereby reduce his expected payoff. This characteristic is known as the winner's curse. 12 Note that the bidding strategies in Lemma 1 do not depend on costs incurred by the investors in earlier stages, namely F , as these costs are sunk at stage 4. The situation of bidders is related to the one of sellers in
Bertrand competition with homogenous goods.
Exclusive Private Screening
If exactly one investor has screened entrepreneur i, he is an insider with respect to i, by definition. Thus, at stage 4, I am looking for a Bayesian equilibrium in a first-price sealed-bid auction, where one bidder has precise information about the value of the project auctioned, whereas m bidders symmetrically have less information.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983) analyze such an auction.
Let β(Z) denote a pure strategy of the insider, in which he maps every value 12 See, for instance, Milgrom and Weber (1982) .
Z that he learns via screening onto a bid b. 13 For each outsider j, a mixed strategy is a distribution G j on R + where G j (b) is the probability that his bid
denotes the distribution of the maximum of the bids made by the outsiders.
Definition 1 (Expected payoffs from one auction) Define E(π OU T ) as the expected payoff of an outsider, E(π IN S ) as the expected payoff of the insider, and E(π i ) as the expected payoff of the entrepreneur selling his project. Define the expectation of the insider's share in the total expected payoff as (1 − θ) and the entrepreneur's share as θ.
Lemma 2 (Auction equilibrium with asymmetric information) (i): The
is an equilibrium point if and only if:
(ii): At equilibrium, each outsider expects E(π OU T ) = 0, the insider expects
Comparing equilibrium strategies in Lemmas 1 and 2.(i), in an auction that was preceded by screening, the outsiders are more cautious than in the symmetric information case if they believe that an insider has additional useful information. They bid according to a mixed strategy over [0, E(Z)] and, thus, avoid the winner's curse in expectation.
According to EMW, Theorem 4, the distribution of the total payoff E(Z)
between the seller and the inside bidder only depends on the realization Z that the insider learns before bidding. Given thatZ is known, θ = θ(Z) is unambiguous, which is common knowledge. For the sake of brevity I will omit Z in the notation of θ below.
The key insight from Lemma 2.
(ii) for this model is that it pays for an investor to be an insider as he makes a positive expected payoff, unlike the symmetric information case of Lemma 1. Unavoidably, this comes at a cost for the entrepreneur selling his project because the project value is not influenced by screening but the insider can appropriate a share of it if he screens. However, if the entrepreneur does not agree to screening, this refusal cannot rationally be used as a signal for low ability from the investors' perspective because entrepreneurs do not know their own relative ability. Therefore, investors have to incentivize entrepreneurs to participate in screening. I will explore next how to achieve this.
Semi-Public Contests
Consider the following candidate equilibrium: At stage 1, all entrepreneurs whose project development does not cost more thanD develop their projects.
All investors spend the entry cost F as long as it is not larger than a threshold level,F . At stage 2, the first of the m + 1 investors, who was randomly selected, chooses to sponsor a semi-public contest and determines a number of winning slots n * for the best participants. The remaining m investors do not offer a contest. At stage 3, all N entrepreneurs participate in the contest and get screened by the jury. All investors observe the contest winners' types, while the insider retains an information advantage with respect to the losers' types.
At stage 4, the auction takes place, in which all investors bid the value Z for each winner of the contest. For each loser, however, bids of the insider and the outsiders differ (in an adjusted version of Lemma 2).
The remainder of this section is dedicated to prove that such a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists. As noted before, this equilibrium is not unique but it is efficient when compared to private screening and no screening, as we will see below. I do not regard a market breakdown equilibrium in more detail, in which no entrepreneur develops a project, no investor enters the market and, hence, innovation does not take place.
Definition 2 (Average values of contest winners and losers) Consider contest j. I define Z n as the expected lowest value of a winner's project, Z w as the expected average value of a winner's project, and Z l as the expected average value of a loser's project.
By assumption, the identities of the best n j entrepreneurs are publicized as winners together with their project values. Every investor also knows the distributionZ. Hence, he can guess Z n , Z w and Z l . It follows that Z l < E(Z) < Z w and that 0 < Z l < Z n < Z w <Z for α j ∈ (0, 1).
What is the bidding equilibrium for an entrepreneur's project at stage 4 if he is a contest winner? In this case, all investors symmetrically have precise information on the value of his project: Z. By the Bertrand competition logic applied in Lemma 1, each investor bids Z and earns an expected payoff of zero.
At stage 3, when the entrepreneur has to decide about contest participation, he does not know the exact value of his project. However, he knows the number of winning slots n j and can form a belief about the number of contest participants N j (see details below). Hence, he can form a belief about α j and use it, together with his knowledge onZ, to guess the average value of a winning project, Z w .
What is the bidding equilibrium if an entrepreneur is a contest loser and there is only one insider knowing his type? This case is similar to the one analyzed in Lemma 2, with the exception that the support of the project value distribution is [0, Z n ], which changes the support of bidding strategies in Lemma
respectively. All this is common knowledge.
At stage 3, every entrepreneur has to make two decisions: (i) whether he wants to participate in a contest at all or whether he prefers private screening or no screening; (ii) conditional on contest participation, where he wants to participate if there are multiple contests offered.
Definition 3 (Entrepreneurs' beliefs) From the perspective of entrepreneur i,N j is the expected number of participants in contest j before i decides about
is the expected winning probability in contest j after i decided to participate in j.
At stage 3, the development cost D i is sunk. If he participates in contest j, entrepreneur i expects a payoff E(π i ) of:
By using E(Z) =α j Z w + (1 −α j )Z l , this can be rewritten as:
An entrepreneur can influence his expected payoff by choosing to participate in a certain contest j, which increases the expected number of participants in that contest by one and, thus, has an influence on the winning probability in j.
Note thatα j influences E(π i ) via three arguments: it has a direct effect (viaα j ) and two indirect effects (via R(α j ) and Z l (α j )). Due to the decreasing effect ofα j on R, E(π i ) is non-monotonic inα j .
Lemma 3 (Optimal winning probability) From entrepreneur i's perspective, there is a unique, well-defined winning probability α * that maximizes his expected payoff.
Lemma 3 implies that entrepreneurs face a trade-off when deciding in which contest to participate. If the winning probability in a contest is high, it comes at a cost because the reputation benefit of being a winner in that contest is small.
In contrast, competition for the high reputation benefit that can be gained in a very exclusive contest is intense. However, there the winning probability is small, by definition, which reduces the expected utility from participation.
Therefore, the expected payoff function of entrepreneurs from contest participation is hump-shaped in the expected winning probability; see Figure 2 . This implies that, forα j > α * , there are positive network externalities, i.e. the expected utility of the participants in contest j increases if another entrepreneur participates in this contest. Forα j ≤ α * , there are negative network externalities because every additional participant drivesα j further away from α * .
To facilitate the comparison of mechanisms I define the winning probability levels, for which entrepreneurs expect the same payoff as from no screening:
Definition 4 (Threshold winning probabilities) Define:
From an entrepreneur's view, private screening is dominated by no screening and by a semi-public contest.
an entrepreneur prefers a semi-public contest over no screening, and vice versa otherwise.
The intuition of Lemma 4.(i) is that entrepreneurs have no interest in pro-
viding information about their types to a single investor as this is not only costly but, due to lower bids, also decreases their expected auction revenues. The intuition of Lemma 4.(ii) is that a semi-public contest can be entrepreneurs' most preferred mechanism if the expected winning probability of a contest lies in an intermediate range and thereby the expected reputation benefit from winning,
This result is mainly due to the inverted effect from α on R(α). Furthermore, the value of R(α) must be sufficiently large at its maximum α * in order to make contest participation attractive for entrepreneurs.
Only then it is possible that in expectation the reputation benefit conditional on becoming a contest winner outweighs the screening cost of an entrepreneur plus the share of the project value that the insider can appropriate conditional on the entrepreneur becomes a contest loser. For the remainder of the analysis I assume that this holds: as a function of the expected winning probability in contest j. Lemma 4 captures entrepreneurs' participation constraint in semi-public contests as a whole. As a next step, I characterize the equilibrium specifying the one contest in which an entrepreneur participates, given that the participation constraint holds and there are possibly multiple contests offered.
Lemma 5 (Contest participation equilibrium) Let Q be the number of contests that offer at least one winning slot, that is for which n j ≥ 1. (i):
, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies that dominates no screening. (ii): Given thatα j (φ * j ) ∈ [α,ᾱ], there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, Φ(φ * j ), ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., Q}, ∀i, that dominates no screening. Every entrepreneur participates in every contest with probability φ * j , where:
If
is the unique symmetric equilibrium (and vice versa).
When every entrepreneur has to decide about contest participation, all entrepreneurs have the same information on the number of winning slots in each contest {n 1 , ..., n Q } and have identical characteristics in expectation. However, they cannot coordinate their participation choices and have no rational basis for asymmetric beliefs on the other entrepreneurs' choices. This explains the use of symmetric Nash equilibrium in this model.
In a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, all entrepreneurs, by definition, participate in the same contest j. Thus, the expected winning probability in this contest isα j = n j N . Lemma 5.(i) states that this winning probability, depending on the reputation associated with it and the screening cost incurred by the entrepreneurs, can lead to higher expected utility for entrepreneurs than the outside option, no screening, which secures them an expected payoff E(Z) from auctioning off their projects.
Lemma 5.(ii) starts from the fact that the expected winning probability of an entrepreneur in contest j is higher than in the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium if the other entrepreneurs participate in j with less than probability one because they participate in other contests with some positive probability.
Then it is possible that entrepreneurs expect a higher utility than under no screening (and than in the pure strategy equilibrium). To make this situation an equilibrium the strategies of the other entrepreneurs make every entrepreneur i indifferent between playing any mixed strategy because they make sure that i faces the same ex post winning probability in every contest, that is given he participates in it. Given this strategy combination, Φ(φ * j ), ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., Q}, ∀i, i expects a winning probability of: 14
The mixed strategy equilibrium is unique if the winning probability from the pure strategy equilibrium, 
where φ * j N is the expected number of entrepreneurs participating in his contest. It is straightforward to observe from (9) that an investor will never organize a semi-public contest if the screening cost k is prohibitive. As the minimum number of winning slots in case a contest is offered is n j = 1, I will only consider cases for the remainder of the analysis, for which the following assumption holds:
Lemma 6 (Competing contests and investor payoff ) Conditional on offering a contest himself, the expected payoff of investor j decreases in the number of contests offered:
Lemma 6 implies that, if investor 1 offers a semi-public contest, his expected payoff decreases in the number of competing contests. This is due to two effects.
First, because of the mixed strategy of entrepreneurs when deciding about contest participation (see Lemma 5.
(ii)), investor 1 expects less participants in his contest for each additional contest that is offered. This also decreases the number of losers in his contest, who are the source of his positive expected payoff in the final auction. It also implies an increased winning probabilityα j for entrepreneurs, which reduces the average value of losers' projects, Z l . Therefore, an investor is hurt twice for each additional contest that is offered.
Consequently, Lemma 6 implies that, given investor 1 offers a contest, he has an incentive to foreclose entry of other investors into the market of contests and to create a monopoly. More precisely, investor 1 has an incentive to deter investor 2 from entry. If this is successful, every investor deciding about offering a contest after investor 2 faces the same problem as investor 2 and will, thus, not enter the contest market.
How can investor 1 avoid that investor 2 offers a contest? Given the sequential set-up of stage 2 of the game, investor 1 can be regarded as the Stackelberg leader and investor 2 the Stackelberg follower. Investor 1 can exploit a firstmover advantage and set n 1 such that investor 2's payoff from playing his best response is negative if and only if n 1 ∈ (n 1 ,n 1 ). 15 This captures two competitive constraints of investor 1 when maximizing his own expected payoff (a lower constraint n 1 and an upper constraintn 1 ) and determines the boundaries of kind of a "limit pricing" strategy. In addition, he has to make sure that the two demand constraints defined in Lemma 5 hold for Q = 1:
Definition 5 (Threshold parameter values) Define n,n as investor 1's binding constraints,k as a cost level that is relevant if the lower demand constraint is binding,k as the effective upper screening cost level of investors,ĉ as the entrepreneurial cost level below which participation in more than one contest is profitable, andc j as the prohibitive cost level of entrepreneurs in contest j:
Note that, if and only if n ≤n, then the intervals (n 1 ,n 1 ) and [αN,ᾱN ] overlap. Only then it is possible for investor 1 to satisfy both demand constraints and competitive constraints. Both of these conditions letk increase and αN decrease. In this case a low screening cost and a high reputation benefit for winners are substitutes, despite k's direct impact on investors and R's direct impact on entrepreneurs. The transmission channel is the number of winners in the contest, n * . If R grows, investor 1 reduces n * but, despite the reduced probability of becoming a winner, entrepreneurs still participate in the contest because they value the increased R in case of winning. In contrast, the investor benefits from a reduction in n * as he only declares winners openly to attract participation of entrepreneurs, not because he benefits from it directly. His payoff comes from contest losers.
Consequently, if R grows, he can afford to set up a contest for higher screening cost. However, if investor 1 reduces n * too much, he risks hurting the lower competitive constraint. Then it becomes profitable for investor 2 to set up a contest, too.
In general, comprising the cases where either the lower demand constraint or the lower competitive constraint are binding, a monopolistic semi-public contest is more likely if the screening cost of investors (k) is low or if the share of the expected average value of a contest loser's project that investor 1 can
A main contribution of this paper is to show existence of a unique semipublic contest in equilibrium. Therefore, complementary to Proposition 1, I
will only outline the conditions that lead to the existence of more than one contest in a less formal and more concise manner below.
Ifc ≥ c >ĉ, every entrepreneur would not participate in more than one contest voluntarily, even if it were organized. Hence, more than one contest can exist in equilibrium. In such a situation, if n >n, investor 1 cannot attract participation of entrepreneurs in his own contest and avoid that a second investor sets up a semi-public contest profitably at the same time. Going one step further, it depends on the parameter realizations of the reputation function R, the screening costs k and c, and the expected average value of a contest loser's project that an inside investor can appropriate, (1 − θ)Z l , whether investors 1 and 2 can profitably prevent entry of a third, etc. investor. Every investor who offers a contest in equilibrium makes nonnegative payoff, while entrepreneurs make an extra expected payoff, on top of their no screening outside option E(Z), only if the demand constraint is not binding (αN < n 1 ).
Proposition 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Private screening and exclusivity of insider) Given n ≤n and the lower demand constraint is binding (αN = n) but k >k, no contest will be offered. Fork < k ≤k, investor 1 may offer private screening at stage 2.
The other investors do neither offer a contest nor private screening. Whenever a semi-public contest is established in equilibrium, it has one exclusive sponsor.
A private screener's net expected payoff is (1 − θ)E(Z) − k per entrepreneur screened, as long as he is the only insider with respect to a certain entrepreneur.
If investor 1 offers private screening because k is too high to offer a contest, all subsequent investors can only change their status from outsider to non-exclusive insider by also offering private screening. However, a second inside investor faces perfect competition with the first insider in the auction at stage 4 and, hence, expects a net payoff of −k, see Lemma 1. It follows that screening of a certain entrepreneur can only be profitable if it takes place exclusively. This also explains why sponsoring of a given contest is always exclusive in equilibrium.
Now it is straightforward to find the equilibrium of stage 1 of the game, where every entrepreneur has to decide whether he wants to develop a project for an individually drawn cost D i and where every investor has to decide about spending the market entry fee F .
Proposition 2 (Market entry equilibrium) Assume that Q contests exist in equilibrium and the expected winning probability in contest j isα * j (φ * j ) = 
Proposition 2 states that at stage 1 of the game all entrepreneurs develop their ideas into projects whose development costs are not larger than the expected payoff from selling the project. Similarly, it states that investors will only enter the market as long as the market entry cost is not larger than the expected payoff from entering. Proposition 2 also implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Competition and hold-up) Competition among investors (m >
0) is necessary to establish a semi-public contest in equilibrium. The contest alleviates a hold-up problem faced by entrepreneurs in private screening.
If there is no competition among investors (m = 0), the monopsonistic investor has no incentive to finance any form of screening. He bids b = in the auction for every project and expects a high monopoly payoff, given that entrepreneurs develop projects. In turn, this reduces entrepreneurs' expected gross payoff from developing an idea to and, hence, deters all entrepreneurs from doing so. Note that any announcement of the monopsonist to organize a contest or to bid more than is not subgame-perfect but cheap talk.
Abstracting from semi-public contests and just comparing private screening and no screening reveals that, in private screening, entrepreneurs suffer from a hold-up problem: first, they are required to spend a relationship-specific investment (c) and, then, are left with less payoff than without screening because E(Z) has to be shared with the monopsonist. Lemma 4.(i) shows that this holdup problem lets the private screening market break down. Proposition 1 shows that, given an investor organizes a contest, entrepreneurs can benefit from it and participate. In this situation, they voluntarily spend the relationship-specific cost as they uniquely provide the sponsor with inside information conditional on becoming a contest loser. The entrepreneurs are motivated to do so because of the very characteristic of a semi-public contest, that with a certain probability (α j ) they are among the winners of a contest and receive a high payoff from information revelation. Hence, the existence of a semi-public contest alleviates the entrepreneurs' hold-up problem faced in private screening.
Corollary 3 (Positive expected payoffs) If, according to Proposition 1, a semi-public contests exists in equilibrium and the lower demand constraint is binding (n = αN ), the contest sponsor expects higher payoffs than under no screening. If the lower demand constraint is not binding (n > αN ), entrepreneurs also expect higher payoffs than under no screening.
This corollary follows from the inequalities in (16) Definition 6 (Welfare and relative efficiency) Welfare comprises the aggregate expected net payoffs of all entrepreneurs and all investors, given a certain mechanism. The one mechanism creating higher welfare than the other two mechanisms is relatively efficient.
Proposition 3 (Relative efficiency) If, according to Proposition 1, a semipublic contest exists in equilibrium, the contest mechanism is relatively efficient.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is that, at stage 2 of the game, investor 1 organizes a contest only if he is sure that entrepreneurs participate in it and that he makes a positive payoff. Going back to stage 1 of the game, every investor calculates the expected payoff from market entry, thereby considering the probability that he will be the investor who organizes a contest profitably.
Corollary 3 implies that the inclusion of the contest mechanism in investors'
action sets at stage 1, on top of private screening and no screening, increases the expected payoffs of investors of the entire game.
Entrepreneurs benefit from investors' consideration of semi-public contests as a mechanism because it increases their expected payoff from owning a developed project over the alternative cases. Hence, they are willing to develop projects whose development cost exceeds their expected gross payoff from no screening, E(Z), up toD ≥ E(Z). This means that in a world with contests more projects are developed than in a world without contests. Many of them (for which D i <D) are welfare enhancing.
Applications
How "realistic" is the theory of semi-public contests presented above? In the following section I will outline two applications that fit the model well. Thereafter, in the concluding section I will condense the key characteristics of these applications into a set of general requirements for economic situations, in which the use of semi-public contests may increase welfare.
Business Plan Competitions
A business plan is a document in which an entrepreneur lays out all aspects of a business idea that are relevant for potential investors. A business plan competition is an organized contest to which entrepreneurs send their business plans. Experts evaluate the business ideas sent in, sometimes in several rounds, and choose the set of winners who are typically awarded prizes in a public ceremony, followed by a lot of media attention. 
TV Casting Shows
In TV casting shows, the "project value" of an entrepreneur is the net present value that can be generated by the singing/dancing talent of would-be pop To exemplify the appropriateness of the model to this application, I will outline some key features of "American Idol" below, which is, according to its can be signed to recording agreements that the corporation maintains with a major record company (Sony/BMG), and benefit from the record sales of contestants and winners who are exposed to the worldwide marketplace through the TV shows."
I have not modeled a profit objective of the jury explicitly, but it is straightforward to adjust the model in a way, such that the sponsor's cost of setting up a given contest j is not N j k but a share of his gross payoff being paid to the jury. This does not change the quality of the results. also a subsidiary of Sony/BMG and also founded by Clive Davis, the founder of J Records. 24 Thus, a "loser" can still be attractive for the sponsor.
Conclusion
In this paper I have characterized a mechanism, semi-public contests, that can solve a dilemma occurring when entrepreneurs with ideas of uncertain value and investors with the necessary complementary resources have to be matched.
I have shown the conditions under which such a contest exists in equilibrium and that it only exists if it is efficient compared to private screening and no screening, two alternatives mechanisms.
Consequently, as long as the assumption holds that there are no positive spillovers from innovation on third parties, apart from entrepreneurs and investors, I can find no justification for direct government intervention in favor of or against semi-public contests. In particular, this paper does not advocate public funding of such contests. However, there is an indirect role for public policy. First, as existence of semi-public contests depends on active competition among innovators, it is crucial that competition policy authorities safeguard competitive markets. Second, as the semi-public contest mechanism has only been used selectively in practice but could be used in many more fields (see below), governments should promote its potential as an institution supporting innovation. If more "investors" in many industries know about it, they might not feel anymore that they are restricted to choosing between private screening and no screening. This can lead to more efficient matches with "entrepreneurs"
and, thereby, increase innovation and welfare. More generally, the model presented in this paper can be applied to economic situations that are characterized by a strong complementarity of inputs and a high degree of hidden information on the value of one of the inputs (where even the owner of this input does not know its true value). Furthermore, the initial creation of the input's value must depend on some kind of ability, talent, or ingenuity of its creator-a notion of human capital-which can be tested by screening. The input's value should also be characterized by a high degree of common value, such that investors face a high degree of price competition if they share information about that value.
These conditions are regularly met in the context of innovation: an inventor or innovator features the idea of a new, valuable product or process but often requires financial resources and expertise on how to transform the initial idea into a marketable product or service. Both private equity investors and public patrons that are specializing in funding start-ups are typical "investors".
The required conditions are also often met in an art or science context, in which the "project" value is embodied in an artist's talent or in a scientist's genius. In such a situation, the artist or scientist often requires financial resources and complementary knowledge of other artists or scientists to develop his talent or idea to its full value. Distributors of art or science, who are interested in the development of a certain technology or in maximizing their profits by contracting the artist's human capital, can support financing and match him with the right co-workers. They serve as "investors". Section 4 has outlined one example for each of these categories, business plan competitions and TV casting shows. Ginsburgh and van Ours (2003) outline the case of a classical music competition.
These characterizations may point on untested applications of the semipublic contest mechanism. For instance, assume an employer faces a very competitive labor market for certain highly skilled workers, say engineers or software developers. Instead of increasing wages more and more, he could set up a semi-public contest testing participants' required capabilities. He could invite several widely accepted industry experts to serve as jury judges and attract many workers' participation by making winning the contest sufficiently attractive. As the best workers are most likely to win the contest, and the winners would be publicized, competing employers would probably offer them high salaries, thereby free-riding on the sponsor's investment. However, the sponsor could employ a row of second-best workers, about whose talent he gained inside information, for relatively modest salaries, thereby making an economic profit. here. Affiliated values create more complex bidding strategies; see Milgrom and Weber (1982) . This also complicates the analysis in stages one, two, and three of the game. Moreover, multidimensional types require additional assumptions to ensure well-behaving bidding functions because investors' preferences may not be single-peaked, anymore.
Most importantly, however, additional complexity would not deliver spectacularly new insights. Assume that each entrepreneur i is characterized by a two-dimensional type drawn from the joint distribution (Z,X). Moreover, assume as a shortcut that one group of investors, named z, is only interested in abilityZ whereas the other group, named x, is only interested in abilityX. Let an investor's group affiliation be common knowledge. This would allow for two sponsors of a given contest in equilibrium, one from each group of investors. In the auction of a certain entrepreneur's project each insider would bid a strategy that takes into account both the bids of outsiders interested in the same type-dimension (along the lines of Lemma 2) and the fact that there is another insider interested in the second type-dimension. It follows that the expected payoff from becoming an insider, which is crucial for the contest equilibrium, has to be discounted by the probability of having a higher valuation for the entrepreneur's project than the second insider, who is interested in the other type-dimension. This makes becoming a sponsor less attractive for investors. The key result, however, that being an insider creates an informational rent in the auction with respect to competing outside investors interested in the same type-dimension, remains unchanged.
Noisy screening and publication of precise project values: What if the jury cannot observe entrepreneurs' project values perfectly but only observeŝ
, where is drawn from a distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 ? The contest mechanism relies on the characteristic that exclusive inside information is valuable for an investor because it leads to a positive expected auction payoff. The cruder the correlation between the insider's signal and the real value of entrepreneurs' projects is-that is the larger σ 2 -the lower is the value of inside information. Thus, the upper threshold for existence of a semipublic contest in equilibrium,k, decreases if σ 2 increases. For sufficiently small σ 2 , the quality of the above results remains the same.
Akin to this argumentation, the assumption was made that the jury publicizes the precise project values of the winners, thereby allowing for Bertrand competition among the investors in the final auction. In practice this may hardly be possible due to incomplete knowledge of the jurors about the future.
Instead, the typical practical solution to this problem is to publicize a ranking of winners, detailing who is the first, the second, ..., the n j 'th winner. As long as the investors have some knowledge about the distribution of project values, they can form (positively correlated) beliefs about the value of a given winning project. As a consequence, contest winners can expect higher bids than contest 25 Note that I do not claim that bidding 8 + is an equilibrium strategy but in equilibrium the z-insider cannot do worse.
losers and gain valuable reputation for their further careers. This may motivate them to participate in a contest.
Endogenous publicity: The production of valuable reputation, where R > 0 is possible, depends on two factors: credibility and publicity. Credibility is endogenous in this paper as the outsiders' beliefs, that contest winners have projects of high value, are confirmed in equilibrium. Publicity can be endogenized by assuming that the sponsor of contest j bears total costs of (N j k + K(R j )), where K(R j ) is increasing in R j and denotes the cost of marketing the contest to investors and potentially to a wider audience. Then, a contest sponsor has two tools, n j and R j , to maximize his payoff, subject to the demand and competitive constraints. This might explain why we observe semi-public contests that create different reputation levels for winners in the same industry. 26 Because one tool of investors, n j , is sufficient for the results of this paper to hold, there is no value added to endogenize publicity, though.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that at least one investor bids E(Z). Then, any b < E(Z) of another investor will lose and generate zero expected payoff. Any b > E(Z) has a positive probability of winning but conditional on winning creates E(π) < 0.
Q.E.D. 27 Dubra (2006) shows that the original proof of uniqueness is slightly incorrect. He does not criticize the validity of EMW, Theorem 1, though, and provides a correct proof instead.
Sketch of Proof of
insider learns before bidding. Hence, there is a one-to-one mapping fromZ onto θ(Z). This shows Lemma 2.(ii). 28
Proof of Lemma 3
Preliminaries: The total derivative of (5) with respect toα j produces the following first-order condition (FOC):
Assumption 1 states that R is decreasing and convex in α. Hence, the same holds with respect toα j . To understand how the average value of contest losers, Z l , depends onα j note that, forα j = 0, all contest participants are losers.
Hence, limα j →0 Z l = E(Z). Forα j = 1, all contest participants are winners.
Hence, limα j →1 Z l = 0. Because, by definition, increasing the expected share of winnersα j decreases Z n , the threshold value between winners and losers, and because the distributionZ is continuous, we have in expectation:
At stage 3 of the game n j is fixed. Hence,α j can only decrease via increasingN j , the expected number of participants. With probability
, a new participant has value Z ∈ [0, Z l ]. With probability
, a new participant has value Z ∈ (Z l , Z n ]. These two effects on the expected level of Z l cancel out. With probabilityα j , a new participant has value Z ∈ (Z n ,Z], which increases Z n and, hence, also increases Z l . Summarizing, the largerα j before a new participant entered the contest, the larger the probability that his entry will have an effect on Z l . This corresponds to the relation:
Proof: Because of (1) hence, RHS → +∞. It follows that, forα j → 1, LHS < RHS. In contrast, for
whereas RHS → 0. It follows that, forα j → 0, LHS > RHS. Because R and Z l are continuous and monotonic inα j , the median value theorem applies. It follows that there exists a unique optimum of (5), at α * .
The second-order condition (SOC) of (5) is given by:
Because of (1) and (B.2), the first three terms of (B.4) are negative. Because of (B.3) and (B.2), the fourth term is also negative. Hence, SOC < 0. It follows that the optimum of (5) at α * is a maximum. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
(i): Abstracting from development cost D i and following Lemma 1, an entrepreneur expects E(Z) if there is no screening. Following Lemma 2, he expects θE(Z) − c < E(Z) from private screening. Private screening is also dominated by a semi-public contest if, drawing on (4):
which holds ∀α j > 0.
(ii): An entrepreneur prefers a semi-public contest over no screening if:
Lemma 3 implies that the expected utility from contest participation is hump-shaped inα j . As the expected utility from no screening is independent of α j , it implies that (B.8) holds with equality either for twoα j -levels or for one or for none. To see this note that in a contest, according to (B.7), limα j →0 E(π i ) = θE(Z) − c and that limα j →1 E(π i ) = Z w (α j = 1) − c = E(Z) − c. Both values are smaller than E(Z). Hence, if E(π i |α * ) > E(Z), which depends on the distribution of R and onZ and on c, all of which are well defined, (B.8) holds with equality for α andᾱ, as defined in (6). These two levels converge in α * for E(π i |α * ) = E(Z). Hence:
It follows that ∀α j ∈ [α,ᾱ], entrepreneurs prefer participation in contest j over no screening, as long as E(π i (α * )) ≥ E(Z). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
(i): Consider a pure strategy of entrepreneur i, according to which he participates in some contest j with probability one. The marginal impact of i's participation in contest j onα j depends on the expected number of other participants in that contest,N j . By the definition ofα j , it follows that:
Hence, in a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium every i will make the same unique choice and participate in the contest such that E(π i ) in that contest is maximized. This creates larger expected utility for i than under no screening if (B.8) holds forα j = n j N or:
which is possible for R( n j N ) sufficiently high or c sufficiently low. Given that (B.11) holds and entrepreneur i deviates unilaterally from choosing j, say by participating in contest s, he will be the only candidate there. Hence,α s = 1, and the reputation benefit is R(α s = 1) = 0, which creates an expected payoff strictly less than from participating in j. Thus, in a unique symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium every entrepreneur participates in the same contest j.
(ii): Let φ j be the probability that entrepreneur i assigns to participation in each contest j that offers n j ≥ 1 winning slots. Let Φ : φ j → j ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q} be the associated mixed strategy of i for all contests. Contests without winning slots are not regarded (φ j (n j = 0) = 0). (B.10) shows that the marginal effect of i's entry on the winning probability in contest j decreases in the expected number of other participants,N j . In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the strategy Φ of each of the other N −1 entrepreneurs has to make entrepreneur i indifferent between participating in this or in that contest, independent of the total number of contests, Q, and independent of the number of winning slots in a contest, n j , ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}. This is accomplished if the expected ex post winning probability in contest j, i.e. assuming that i participates in j, is equal ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}. Recall that this probability is defined asα j ≡ n ĵ N j +1 withN j = φ j (N − 1) as the expected number of entrepreneurs other than i participating in j.
The mixed strategy equilibrium can be found by solving the following system of Q equations, where j and s are two arbitrary contests:
(B.12) states Q−1 indifference conditions: the winning probability
that i faces after his entry in one of the Q contests must be the same in every single contest. (B.13) closes the equation system by stating that all entry probabilities that i assigns to the Q contests must sum up to one. There are Q unknown variables, {φ 1 , ..., φ Q }, and Q equations. The solution to the system is given by φ * j , as stated in Lemma 5.(ii). To see this, substitute φ * j for φ j and φ s into (B.12). This gives:
14)
It follows that, if the other N − 1 entrepreneurs play Φ(φ * j ), i cannot change his expected utility from contest participation whatever strategy he plays. It follows that Φ(φ * j )∀i constitutes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Note that Lemma 5.(i) characterizes the special case of 5.(ii) for Q = 1.
Uniqueness: Assume a symmetric mixed strategy that puts a weight φ j > φ * j on participation in one contest, j. Due to (B.13), this implies a reduction of the participation probability in another contest, s = j: φ s < φ * s . Thus, α j <α s , which makes either j or s more attractive for all other entrepreneurs. However, because of the different marginal effects of entry (by n j and byN j ) on the winning probabilityα j , see (B.10), the only alternative equilibrium is one where all entrepreneurs choose the same contest with probability one, hence 5.(i) rules out this alternative and Φ(φ * j )∀i is the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
Asymmetric mixed strategies or beliefs: Note that it is possible to construct multiple asymmetric Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, in which one entrepreneur i assigns a higher probability φ j > φ * j to one contest and a lower probability φ s < φ * s to another contest, and another entrepreneur g = i does the reverse. If deviations from φ * j are symmetric, such that, from the perspective of i,α j is the same ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}, this strategy combination constitutes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this requires some coordination among the entrepreneurs: who participates in which contest with which probability. Alternatively, asymmetric beliefs among the entrepreneurs about the other N − 1 entrepreneurs' behavior could also support an asymmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, as long asα j is the same ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}. However, the question arises where such balancing asymmetric beliefs should come from among ex ante identical players. Therefore, I perceive the concept of symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as more appropriate for this model. ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Hence, every i cannot change the expected winning probability that he faces after entry despite the fact that the number of winning slots is different across the five contests. Consequently, i cannot increase his expected utility by deviating from Φ(φ * j ).
50 . This is due to the fact thatα j simulates i's participation in every contest, whereas 1 N Q q=1 n q captures the "objective" expected winning probability, given that every i can just enter one contest.
Proof of Lemma 6
(9) depends on Q in three ways: via φ * j , via Q q=1 n q , and via Z l (α j (φ * j )). Ceteris paribus, if there is one additional contest offered, say contest q, the total number of winning slots increases by n q ≥ 1. Hence:
We can use this and (8) in:
Using (B.2) and (B.16), it follows that:
From (7) and (B.15), we obtain:
Finally, we can take the total derivative of (9) with respect to Q:
Due to (B.18) and Assumption 3, the first term of (B.19) is negative. It follows from (9) that, in order to avoid losses, an investor must offer less winning slots than the expected number of participants in his contest: n j < φ * j N . Because of this and (B.17), the second term of (B.19) is negative, too. It follows that: If c >ĉ, it is still possible that exactly one contest is offered in equilibrium.
Substituting (7) in (9) for j = 2, and rearranging the FOC of this expression with respect to n 2 yields investor 2's best-response function depending on the number of winning slots set by investor 1: If the Stackelberg leader can set n 1 such that (B.24) is negative, investor 2 will not enter. Inspecting the first-order and second-order conditions of (B.24) with respect to n 1 reveals that (B.24) has a well-defined minimum level, which leads to a negative expected Stackelberg follower payoff. 29 Solving (B.24) for zero shows that investor 2's expected payoff is negative for all n 1 ∈ (n 1 ,n 1 ), where: Given the competitive constraints hold, it follows that Q = 1 and, thus, φ * 1 = 1; see (7). Hence, investor 1 maximizes (N − n 1 )(1 − θ)Z l − N k, which yields, by total differentiation: The calculations are standard and omitted for the sake of brevity. 30 Note that whether n ≤n, or vice versa, depends on the parameter realizations. Since n 1 andn1 (but not αN andᾱN ) depend on k and only αN andᾱN (but not n 1 andn1) depend on R(α) and c, both cases are possible. It would not add value to the main contribution of this paper, which is to show that semi-public contests can exist in equilibrium, to specify the threshold levels of k, R(α), or c.
investor 1 sets n 1 to the lowest level that lets all constraints hold, i.e. to set n 1 = n. When does this lead to nonnegative expected payoff for investor 1?
First, assume the lower competitive constraint is binding: n = n 1 . Substituting (B.25) in investor 1's expected payoff function, E(π 1 (Q = 1, n 1 )) = (N − n 1 )(1 − θ)Z l − N k, (B.28)
setting it equal to zero, and rearranging yields that E(π 1 (Q = 1, n 1 )) ≥ 0 ∀k ≤
(1 − θ)Z l . Due to Assumption 3 this holds for all valid parameter values.
Second, assume the lower demand constraint is binding: n = αN . Substituting this in (B.28), setting it equal to zero, and rearranging yields that 29) wherek is increasing in R(α) and decreasing in c. Whetherk is smaller or larger thank depends on the realizations of R, c, andZ. Which of the two lower constraints is binding, i.e. whether n 1 is larger or smaller than αN , also depends on the realizations of the parameters. As can easily be seen from (6), αN increases in c and decreases in R(α). Hence, the larger R(α) or the smaller c, the smaller the probability that the demand constraint is binding.
If investor 1 offers a contest, satisfying the competitive constraints makes sure the best-response of investor 2 (and subsequent investors) is not to offer a contest. If investor 1 does not offer a contest because k is too large, all other investors have the same incentives not to do so since they are identical ex ante.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
At stage 1, all parameter realizations that are relevant to determine the equilibria in stages 2, 3, and 4 are common knowledge. Hence, all players can determine the equilibrium number of contests and contest slots.
Investor j knows that the probability that he is determined by nature to act as the first investor in stage 2 is 1 m+1 . Given the conditions in Proposition 1.(i) hold, he will organize a contest and expect a payoff of (N − n * )(1 − θ)Z l − N k in this case. If there are two contests offered in equilibrium, investor j expects (φ * 1 N −n * 1 )(1−θ)Z l −φ * 1 N k with probability 1 m+1 and (φ * 2 N −n * 2 )(1−θ)Z l −φ * 2 N k with probability 1 m . In general, if the profitable existence of Q contests can be foreseen, investor j's expected net payoff from market entry is: 
Proof of Proposition 3
The benchmark solution with which each mechanism has to be compared is market breakdown, which yields welfare W BD = 0. Define N N S (and N P S )
as the number of entrepreneurs whose development cost in expectation is not larger than E(Z) (not larger than θE(Z)−c). It follows that N P S < N N S < N .
Assuming that projects are developed, in the no screening and private screening cases, welfare is: 
